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________________________
OPINION
________________________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Kakkadasan Sampathachar initiated this action asserting breach of
contract and bad faith against defendant Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company when
Federal Kemper refused to pay on a life insurance policy following the alleged drowning
of plaintiff’s wife, Pannathpur Jaylakshmi Sampathachar, in 2001. A jury trial was held,
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at which Federal Kemper attempted to establish that Mrs. Sampathachar was not dead.
The jury found for plaintiff on the breach of contract claim, and Federal Kemper now
appeals, asserting various errors by the District Court at trial. We find no errors meriting a
new trial, and we therefore affirm.1
I. BACKGROUND
Because we write only for the parties, our summary of the facts is abbreviated.
Plaintiff and his wife immigrated to Philadelphia from India in 1972. In the 1990's, Mrs.
Sampathachar developed signs of depression in response to the death of her elderly
mother and later the death of a young Indian guru whom she considered her spiritual
advisor. Between 1995 and 1999, Mrs. Sampathachar secured $10.5 million in life
insurance from seven different insurance companies. Among these was a $1 million
policy from Federal Kemper. That policy became incontestable in 1997, so that coverage
could not be contested based on suicide or based on false statements in the application.
According to Federal Kemper, Mrs. Sampathachar included material lies about her
income and net worth in several of the applications for life insurance. In February 1997,
the Sampathachars filed for bankruptcy.
In 2001, the Sampathachars moved from Philadelphia back to India. According to
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This action was originally filed in state court and was removed by the defendant to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441. The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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plaintiff, Mrs. Sampathachar unexpectedly left their home near Bangalore, India at 4:30
in the morning on October 17, 2001, carrying nothing except the clothes she was wearing.
Plaintiff reported the disappearance to the police and offered a reward. On October 28,
plaintiff was informed by the police that Mrs. Sampathachar had checked into a hotel in
Devaprayag, India, a village on the Ganges River about 2500 kilometers from plaintiff’s
home. Plaintiff’s relatives searched for Mrs. Sampathachar in Devaprayag, and when she
could not be found, they hired rafters to search for her body in the Ganges River. A
partially decomposed female body was discovered, and plaintiff’s nephew identified the
body as Mrs. Sampathachar. Plaintiff and his brother-in-law then traveled to Devaprayag
and also identified the body.
A postmortem examination revealed that the body did not have a uterus, which was
consistent with the fact that Mrs. Sampathachar had undergone a hysterectomy. Federal
Kemper alleges, however, that the body did have ovaries and fallopian tubes and that
there was no hysterectomy scar, and that these facts were not consistent with Mrs.
Sampathachar’s medical records. Federal Kemper also alleges that the dental information
in the postmortem report was not consistent with Mrs. Sampathachar’s dental records.
Plaintiff had the body cremated following the postmortem examination, and an Indian
death certificate was obtained.
Federal Kemper now asserts that the District Court erred in (1) failing to require in
the jury instructions and verdict sheet that the jury determine whether the body pulled
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from Ganges River was in fact Mrs. Sampathachar; (2) refusing to admit at trial tax
returns, evidence related to prior bankruptcy proceedings, and financial misstatements by
Mrs. Sampathachar in her applications for life insurance; and (3) admitting at trial the
death certificate and expert testimony by a forensic dentist.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Identity of the Body Pulled From the River
Federal Kemper argues that under Pennsylvania law,2 the jury instructions and the
verdict form used at trial should have required the jury to specifically determine whether
the body pulled from the Ganges River was that of Mrs. Sampathachar, rather than
simply requiring the jury to determine whether Mrs. Sampathachar was dead.3 We
consider the legal correctness of jury instructions and verdict forms de novo. See United
States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 255 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d
1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 2005).
Federal Kemper provides no support for its claim of error in the jury instructions
and verdict form. A plaintiff asserting a breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law
must establish three elements: “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential
2

The District Court concluded that Pennsylvania law was applicable to this case, and
neither party appeals that finding here.
3

On this point, the verdict form included the following interrogatory: (1) “Do you find
by a preponderance of the evidence that Pannathpur Jaylakshmi Sampathachar is dead?”
Federal Kemper proposed the following alternative: “Do you find that Kakkadasan
Sampathachar has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the body retrieved
from the Ganges River on November 6, 2001 was his wife, Pannathpur Sampathachar?”
5

terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract[,] and (3) resultant damages.” Ware
v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, Federal Kemper did not dispute the existence of the contract and
the applicable damages were not in question. The central issue at trial, then, was whether
Federal Kemper breached its duty under the contract by failing to pay life insurance
benefits to the plaintiff. Under the contract, payment was due only upon the death of the
insured, and Federal Kemper based its defense on the assertion that Mrs. Sampathachar
was not dead. Thus, plaintiff’s burden was to prove to the jury by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mrs. Sampathachar was dead.4 This requirement was fully described to the
jury in both the jury instructions and the verdict form. The District Court therefore did not
err in refusing to require the jury to make a separate finding that the body found in the
Ganges River was that of Mrs. Sampathachar.5
B. The District Court’s Exclusion of Evidence
Next, Federal Kemper argues that the District Court erred at trial in excluding: (1)
evidence of plaintiff’s 1997 bankruptcy proceedings; (2) evidence of financial false
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Under the contract, plaintiff was also required to submit due proof of his wife’s death
to Federal Kemper, and the District Court separately asked the jury to determine whether
this requirement was satisfied. The District Court’s interrogatory and jury instructions on
this point are not challenged here.
5

Moreover, given that plaintiff’s case at trial rested entirely on evidence that Mrs.
Sampathachar drowned in the Ganges River and that the body pulled from the river was
hers, we can reasonably assume, based on the jury’s verdict, that the jury concluded that
the body pulled from the river was in fact Mrs. Sampathachar’s body.
6

statements made by Mrs. Sampathachar in her applications to other companies for life
insurance; and (3) plaintiff’s tax returns for 1997 and 1998, which were partially paid in
2000 and indicated that the Sampathachars were having financial difficulties. This Court
reviews a District Court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.
In re Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1990).
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence of a person’s acts is not admissible
“to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith,” but
may be admissible to prove motive or preparation, or the existence of a plan. Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b). Evidence is not admissible unless it is relevant, meaning that it has “any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R.
Evid. 401, 402. Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Here, the excluded evidence did have some tendency to support Federal Kemper’s
allegation of a fraudulent scheme, suggesting that the Sampathachars were in financial
trouble in the late 1990s and that Mrs. Sampathachar was taking pains to collect life
insurance policies while hiding her financial problems. We note initially, however, that
the use of bankruptcy evidence to indicate financial difficulties has been disapproved of
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by some courts. See, e.g., United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir.
1999); United States v. Reed, 700 F.2d 638, 642-43 (11th Cir. 1983). More significantly,
all of the excluded evidence had a significant potential for improperly prejudicing the jury
against the plaintiff and Mrs. Sampathachar. Nonetheless, the District Court did permit
related evidence, including the number of policies Mrs. Sampathachar applied for and
their dollar amounts, and financial information about the Sampathachars for the two years
prior to Mrs. Sampathachar’s death. We discern no error in regard to the excluded
evidence.
Abuse of discretion is a highly deferential standard, under which we will reverse a
District Court’s finding as to the relative probative and prejudicial value of evidence only
where the district court’s “analysis and resulting conclusion [is] ‘arbitrary or irrational.’”
United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). That requirement is clearly not met here, and we hold that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence at issue.
C. The District Court’s Admission of Evidence
Lastly, Federal Kemper argues that the District Court erred in admitting a death
certificate from India, and in allowing the expert testimony of Dr. Linda Himmelberger, a
forensic dentist. These admissions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Merritt Logan,
901 F.2d at 359.
Federal Kemper asserts that the death certificate was not authenticated, as required
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by the Federal Rule of Evidence. Plaintiff argues that the admission was proper under
Rule 901, which provides that “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). That Rule
also provides that, as to public records or reports, the admissibility requirement is
satisfied by “[e]vidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact
recorded or filed in a public office . . . is from the public office where items of this nature
are kept.” Rule 901(b)(7). In May 2004, a deposition was taken in India of Madhav
Mewar Guru, who testified that he works in the Devaprayag town area committee, which
maintains the official death records for the area. Guru stated that he issued the death
certificate for Mrs. Sampathachar according to protocol. He noted that the executive
officer is supposed to issue the certificate, but that when the executive officer is not
present, he issues the certificate. Based on this evidence, the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the death certificate.
As for the forensic dentist, Dr. Himmelberger testified at trial that a tooth count
performed during the post-mortem examination of the body was not reliable, and also
stated that there were certain similarities between the teeth in the post-mortem photos and
Mrs. Sampathachar’s teeth as seen in her dental records. Federal Kemper argues that the
District Court should have excluded Dr. Himmelberger’s testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. The Supreme Court has interpreted that rule to require the trial court to
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make a preliminary determination as to proffered expert testimony “whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and [] whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). The District Court determined
that Dr. Himmelberger’s testimony was admissible under that standard and would be
useful to the jury. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in this
regard.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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